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FOREWORD
The terms "Authority" and "Public Authority" have become bywords in legis-
lative planning for long-range development of State institutional facilities.1
From an extensive 1956 study by a New York legislative commission, called
upon to investigate multi-billion dollar Authority operations in that State, came this
declaration:2
The public authority is one of the most significant of developments in modern govern-
mental administration. It has captured the imagination of the public and has gained
substantial support in the investing community. Over the last fifty years the public
authority device has grown into a significant element of government.... So great has
been its growth that the public authority requires recognition as a significant vehicle for
public administration.
An earlier survey by the Council of State Governments, made at the request of
the Governors Conference of 1952, found that since World War II the States in-
creasingly have adopted legisition setting up Public Authorities to finance and
construct a variety of governmental services.
To avoid becoming enmeshed in a complicated governmental proliferation which
is roughly bounded on one side by purely political subdivisions and by wholly-
owned government or public corporations4 on the other, it is necessary to adopt
a working description of a standard Public Authority. Therefore, in broad terms
for the moment, a Public Authority will be deemed to be a limited legislative
agency or instrumentality5 of corporate form intended to accomplish specific purposes
involving long-range financing of certain public facilities without legally or directly
impinging upon the credit of the State.
LL.B. 1948, Atlanta Law School. Attorney, Atlanta, Ga. Member of Federal, Georgia, and Atlanta
Bar Associations. Contributor to legal periodicals.
'For an earlier treatment of the subject by the author, see Gerwig, Public Authorities: Legislative
Panacea?, 5 J. PUB. L. 387 (1956).
' NEW YoRx TmPORARY STATE COMMa'N ON THE COORDINATION Ol STATE ACTIVITIES, PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES UNDER NEw YoRx STATE 3 (1956) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. STUDY].
.. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVER.NMENTS, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES 1 (1953) [hereinafter cited
as CoUNcIL REPOa'RT].
'The standard description of public corporations evolves from an opinion by Justice Story in a famous
case: ". .. public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes,
where the whole interests belong also to the government." Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668-69 (I819). Public Authorities thus are a type of the broad form of public
corporanon but have distinguishing characteristics, as will be seen.
'Ie agency or instrumentality here contemplates the entity created by the State for the accomplish-
ment of a particular State function, and not the means through which the State as a sovereign effectuates
its governmental functions. The intended result of this process, inter alia, is to make the Public
Authority responsible for its independent action's, apart from liability, if any, of the State.
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I
THE SEMAN"C PROBLEM
The Public Authority mechanism has undergone so many mutations that the
fundamental kinship is sometimes difficult to recognize. In fact, the true nature of
the Public Authority often is so camouflaged that discouragement frequently faces
the questioner when seeking basic information on the subject.
We begin our quest with the lexicographers: Webster, after giving the primary
meaning of the word "authority" as legal or rightful power, tells us in a secondary
definition that "authority" can be a person or a board or commission having quasi-
governmental power in a particular field, as a Port Authority; and his legal cousin
Black would have us understand, by the definition most pertinent to this com-
mentary, that in the English law relating to public administration, an Authority is
a body having jurisdiction in certain matters of a public nature.
Added to the difficulty of a common precise understanding of the term
"Authority" as used for our purposes is a lack of uniformity in classification or
indexing of data pertaining thereto. Because of near limitless variations of the
Authority form in practice, related treatises and source materials confront the
researcher with a dismaying array of overlapping and duplicitous signposts. To
arrive at a reasonably predictable destination the Authority traveler must, in the
probable absence of direct signals like "Public Authorities," follow tortuous detours
into generalities found under such headings as States, State Governments, State and
Local Governments, State Corporations, Public Administration, Public Finance,
Public Corporations, Revenue Bonds, etc. Of course, the more seasoned voyager
most likely will head for a specific terminal point, as the [State] Port Authority, and
then make similar calls to a specific State Building or Toll Bridge Authority, etc.7
To heighten the spirit of the chase, legislators with seeming abandon occasionally
discard the word "Authority" altogether in favor of "commission," "board," or
"corporation." Current fashions tend toward even more generalized combined
forms like State public benefit corporations," or municipal supplementary public
corporations and special purpose public bodies And those who would track the
Authority of pioneer days must be cognizant of trading companies, water and other
special district or area designations. No more than passing note can be given to
myriad Authorities spawned by political divisions subordinate to State legislatures-
municipal, county, and other intrastate development bodies. Beyond these still are
'To avoid complications with the generic term "authority," the capitalized forms, Authority or
Public Authority, will be used when referring to public entities, as distinguished from an abstract term
signifying power.
'Although standard indexes of source material have begun to accumulate pertinent entries under the
heading "Authorities," a lead to a specific Authority is still a good bet.
"N.Y. Sr~riY 63-67.
93 CHasTER JsA~s ANsrF.Au, MuNmciAL ConPopaxONs LAw ch. 28 (ig6o); C uanES S. RsHYNE,
MUNICIPAL LAw 6-7 (957).
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the "outer-space" counterparts-interstate and regional Authorities which transcend!
normal political boundaries even as astronauts pass through traditional Earth-bound
courses.
Specific use of the term "Authority" does not necessarily admit a unit, not other-
wise qualified, into the close society of standard Authorities. Thus, even the giant
Tennessee Valley Authority-though a valuable model of techniques and administra-
tion-does not qualify as a bona fide Authority within the sense of this discussioni
because of its lack of financial autonomy ° Examples of other types which generally-
will not be included here except perhaps for passing reference are those development
and credit Authorities which are substantially dependent upon the parent body for-
financial support and those which, despite the Authority label, are simply State
administrative agencies or "atypical" Authorities, as one editor has distinguished
some of the extreme offshoots." As the newer Authorities are established with less;
autonomy, it may become desirable and even necessary to distinguish "independent"
Authorities from those which are subject to close control.
Some current text writers on governmental operations have recognized the
growth of the Authority instrumentality to the extent of including a subchapter on,
one or more phases of the topic.' Others refer at least hurriedly to new types of
public financing with a reference to the archetype of American Authorities-the:
Port of New York Authority.' Occasionally, even among the late texts, there will
be but a single sentence noting the emergence of separate Authorities "or corpora-
tions" which borrow or spend for the State without technically using the State's;
credit. 4
However, sometimes an author will devote an informative and analytic chapter
on what at least in some areas are described as established agencies of local govern-
ment, including Authorities.' 5 An advance in the maturity of Authorities as a-
distinct unit of public activity was the inclusion in a standard casebook of a brief
analysis of local government problems affecting Authorities0 6
Major milestones in the recognition of Authorities are reflected by the studie
conducted by the Council of State Governments and the New York Legislative-
Commission17 and finally at least partial consideration by the 1957 Census oF
20 E.g., Austin J. Tobin, Executive Director, Port of New York Authority, from an address at Rutgers.
University, March 26, 1953, P. ii n.9; comment by Mr. Raymond Moley, quoted by Mr. Tobin, supra,.
p. 1S; FoRD P. HALL, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINmS 548 (1949); Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with-
Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.)J. 234, 235 n.2-
(958).
123 ENcyc. GA. LAw, Authority Financing § 6 (1961).
"
2 E.g., ALIERT B. SAYRE, GEORGIA GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY 334-37 (1957).
"For a more detailed discussion of the Port of New York Authority, see Goldstein, An Authority itr
Action-An Account of the Port of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities, infra, at 715-24.
" E.g., WILLIAM ANDERSON, CLARA PENNIMAN & EDWARD W. WRIDNER, GOVERNMENT IN TIM FirrV
STATES 339-40 (1960).
" To be found only after piercing the veil of the title: JOHN C. Bo.aENs, SpcIAL DisTRucT GoVERN-
ErNTS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 7, Dependent Districts and Authorities (1957).
" JEFFERSON B. Foswmt ., LocA. GovE-tmwrr LAw 33-34 (1949)-
17 See notes 2, 3 $upra.
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Governments,"8 all of which spotlighted what had theretorore been little more
than an experiment in public finance. 9
At least one encyclopedia of local law in a State which has been in the fore-
front of the recent Authority movement soon will contain a full analysis of local
Authorities in general with a supplemental chapter on local housing Authorities.20
Thus, while the study guides are not yet so well marked as to provide un-
mistakable paths of research, nevertheless Authorities have attained status to the
point where a relatively substantial body of source material has become available
to the diligent searcher, who should be able to identify and classify a given Public
Authority as an amalgam of various types of corporate or administrative structure
established by legislative enactment to finance (primarily by means of revenue
anticipation bonds), construct, and maintain a public facility, the user-charges for
which will be expected to defray the necessary debt service.
Perhaps the best description of the true Authority is that offered by an experi-
enced Authority administrator:21
a public corporation set up outside the regular framework of federal, state or local
government, and freed from the procedures and restrictions of routine government
operations, in order that it may bring the best techniques of private management to the
operation of a self-supporting or revenue-producing public enterprise.
II
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Ambiguity concerning Authorities is not restricted to problems of definition and
recognition. Difficulties encountered in charting the early history of Authorities are
traceable to similar confusion arising from the many-sided nature and purposes of
what has evolved as a singular legislative device for coping with fiscal problems
confronting large-scale development in public activity areas.IBecause the Authority essentially is of corporate structure (modified, to be sure,
by whatever "quasi" form appears appropriate), perhaps it is not surprising to find
that the genesis of Authorities* can be discovered in the interesting history sur-
rounding the origin of corporations. In at least one discourse on the embryonic
manifestation of the corporate birth, the fact of propinquity (as within the ancient
concepts of family, clan, and tribe) in itself was used as the basis for combining
identity of interest to achieve a common purpose. Thus, it was concluded, the
corporation "grew by nature," but for political expediency it became necessary to
4
'create" corporations by sovereign power.22  Similarly for fundamental reasons of
revenue and control, early English communities of interest (e.g., boroughs and
guilds) were subjected to forms of incorporation primarily for public purposes
181 U.S. BUREAu os re CENSUS, D.'r oF COMMERCE, 1957 CENSUS oF GOVERNMENTS, No. 3, LoCAL
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (1958).
"'With the exception of the massive Port of New York Authority. See Goldstein, An Authority in
Ac'tion-An Account of the Port of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities, in ra, at 715-24.
go 3 ENcyc. GA. LAw, Authority Financing §§ 1-45 (196t); id. Housing Authotities (to be published).
"
1 Tobin, supra note io, at 1. -. , : ' -
" Raymond, The Genesis of the Corporation, i9 HARv. L. REv. 350, 362 (z9o6).
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before the general development of the private corporation. An experienced observer
of business and governmental affairs recently underscored the public nature of
such developments by describing the early English corporations as evidence of an
"extended arm of royal power to get things done."2  Another area of medieval
Authority activity can be illustrated by reference to the early city-states of Genoa and
Venice, which developed Public Authorities to administer maritime law and control
port traffic? 4
From the original premise of a corporation as a governmental technique, it is but
a relatively simple matter to telescope the centuries of time during which the
corporate form was refined. A brief halt at a way station, however, would focus
attention momentarily upon the earliest use of corporations in the then New World
to exercise basic functions of public government by way of English colonial charters.
In fact, it even has been suggested that the basic form of public government in
America derived from a so-called commercial-or rather, proprietary-corporation:
the Virginia Corporation, which was chartered in i6o6.2 The historic trading com-
panies of the early seventeenth century, organized to promote commerce between
North America and Europe, indeed have been cited as forerunners of today's Public
Authorities?6
Except for purposes of remote historical ancestry, the Public Authority of today's
generally accepted form may be traced back to the early nineteenth century patterns
of American public finance. The first great wave of over-optimistic speculation,
coupled with reckless expenditures related to State-sponsored activities, such as
railroads, turnpikes, canals, banks, etc., came to a halt with the depression of the
late i83o's. Many of these enterprises were doomed from the outset because of their
sponsors' combined lack of business administrative techniques and appreciation of
business methods and judgment?7  Irresponsible financial administration by State
legislatures and their agencies resulted in widespread default of State-guaranteed
debts. Inevitable reactions of public resentment and humility led, in turn, to
general enactment of severe constitutional restrictions upon the power of legis-
latures and the use of State credit?8 By 1857, more than half of the States had
amended their constitutions to restrict borrowing powers and, following the fiscal
turbulence of the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, most of the remaining
States, including those newly admitted, enacted some type of constitutional debt
"S Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (Mason ed. ig6o). See
also JEWELL CASS PHILLIPS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA ch. 15 (1954), tracing the pre-
Anglo-Saxon beginning and Anglo-Saxon patterns of local government. For a recent survey of the
companion rules of State and corporation, see Harbrecht & McCallin, The Corporation and the State in
Anglo-American Law and Politics, io J. PU. L. 47 (1961).
M ARVIN L. FAIR, PORT ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1953).
2 Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in EDwARD S. MASON (ED.), THE CORPORATION MS
MODERN SOCIETY ch. ii (1960).
"8 COUNCIL REPORT 21.
"' HAROLD KOONTZ & RICHARD GABLE, PUSLIC CONTROL OF ECONOMIC ENTErRISE 698 (1956).
as COUNCIL REPORT 9, 11; Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 91 S.E.2d 66o (1956); and Annot., 152
A.L.R. 495 (1944).
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restriction. Generally, such restrictions limited gross amounts of borrowing, placed
a ceiling on borrowing by reference to a percentage of the assessed valuation, or
restricted .borrowing to total tax revenues. Many provided for the additional
requisite of popular referendum 9
Interwoven in the debt pattern were the development of revenue bond financing-
iby which the borrowing agency could finance public enterprises out of revenue from
-charges paid by users of the facilities-and the emerging dominance in the public
mind of the corporate form of organization as a symbol of effective business
.administration in an urban industrial societyY0
But widescale adaptation of the corporation to the function of public enterprise
-as a means of solving constitutional debt limitations did not come at once. True,
there were some experimental gestures of public borrowing through revenue bonds
paid only from the income of revenue-producing enterprises, but these were linked
mostly with the improvement of water systemsYl The Authority was still untested
in a large sense, although it was experiencing "growing pains."
A giant step in the development of Public Authorities came in i921 with the
-establishment of the Port of New York Authority-patterned in part after the Port
.of London Authority, created twelve years earlier-which was to become the
.archetype of Public Authority administration in this country.
The massive development, scope, and accomplishments of the Port of New
York Authority are explored in another portion of this Symposium 2 We shall
linger only long enough to note that the Authority represented a major compromise
;between two States to reconcile longstanding and complicated jurisdictional problems
-of a sprawling and congested terminal area. It should be observed also that the
establishment of the interstate agency reflected at the time a rare use of the compact
.clause of the Federal Constitution 3 Perhaps mention should be made of the fact
that the Port Authority's successful operation fathered a by-product in the Authority
pattern-use of the income of paid-up facilities to finance additional facilities not
'within the original contemplation of the initial bond issues, thus tending to perpetuate
-the Authority's existence.
Additional Authorities appeared in the United States at a relatively slow rate for
the next several yearsO4 Some States enacted revenue bond legislation authorizing
regular units and agencies of government to employ such method of financing?"
'The depression of the early 193o's brought on a drastic reduction in State financial
programs and contributed to the rise of Authority-financing as a means of supporting
2 For a summary of constitutional restrictions, see COUNCuM. RaORT 11-18.
10 CouNciL REPoRT ch. 2.
"
1 E.g., special water districts in Maine at the turn of the twentieth century.
"' See Goldstein, An Authority in Action-An Account of the Port oj New York Authority and Its
,Recent Activities, infra, at 715-24.
" "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . .enter into any Agreement or Compact with
;another State .... ."U.S. CoNsr., art. i, § io. See joint resolutions of Congress granting consent, 42
Stat. 174, 822 (i92i). Although the compact clause had been used frequently in interstate relations, it
lad not theretofore been used as the basis for a permanent interstate body.
"' COUNCIL REPORT 25.
35 Ibid.
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public works. A prime stimulus was given the Public Authority technique in 1934
when President Roosevelt addressed a letter to the governors recommending
legislation that would enable greater participation in Federal public works. The
President indicated the feasibility of State legislation authorizing the issuance of
revenue bonds to finance revenue-producing improvements and suggested that
such authority be given not only to existing governmental agencies but also to newly
created public corporations? The legal division of the Public Works Administration
was placed at the disposal of the States, and much of the stimulation as well as the
form of Authority legislation may be credited to its staff?' The reaction to what
seemed a custom-made remedy for State fiscal ills was immediate: at least nineteen
States established Authorities for financing revenue-producing projects within two
years, and by 1951 forty-one States had enacted legislation to establish Authorities.?'
Enthusiastic resort to Authorities provoked concern in some quarters, lest too
hasty adoption of a magic formula might lead to disappointment. Thus in 1936 New
York's Governor Lehman, responding to demands for increased Authority financing
in that State, warned that although the Authority might well be a reasonable method
to reach a desired end, nevertheless such an agency should not be created to displace
permanent and regular government agencies; and he urged the New York legislators
"to exercise great restraint and care" in establishing additional Authorities0 9
The advent of World War II interrupted State programs for constructing public
improvements. The resulting backlog of needs in the usual areas of State responsi-
bility for transportation (including port and terminal facilities, highways, bridges,
tunnels, ferries, and transit systems) was soon multiplied many times by unprece-
dented post-war needs for housing and public buildings (including schools and
dormitories, administrative offices, courts, etc.), dams, airports, hospitals, armories,
and parking facilities. The ever-widening purpose of Authorities has been extended
to recreational facilities, garbage disposal plants, and steam heating and distribution
systems. Somewhat far removed from the ordinary ambit of Authorities, one can
find such objectives as industrial exhibits, municipal theaters, planetariums, war
memorials, and mineral springs. The practice of utilizing Authorities for other than
standard government functions suited to revenue bond financing has been
questioned.40
By 1955, New York alone legislatively created fifty-three Authorities, of which
thirty-three were then still active,4' with assets of $2.3 billions, liabilities of $1.8
billions. These figures included Authorities on all recognized levels, municipal,
county, regional, and State.
A recent survey in Pennsylvania listed 1140 municipal Authorities, reflecting
8o Id. at 26.
"'Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprise, 35 MIcH. L. REV. i (1936).
88 COUNCIL REPORT 27.
D Tobin, supra note Io, at xi.
40 Ibid.
" Some were abolished, having accomplished the purpose for which formed; others were consolidated,
and at least one remained inactive. N.Y. STUDY 583-85.
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issuance of almost $i billion worth of bonds, mostly for purposes of schools, water-
works, and housing. This spectacular growth followed a liberal 1945 statute which
has been described as "the broadest Authority legislation in the nation. 4
In the Sixth Federal Reserve District, the full-faith-and-credit debt of six Southern
States dropped from eighty per cent of total debt outstanding in 1946 to thirty-four
per cent by 1957. The sharp rise in non-State-guaranteed debt was attributed to the
remarkable growth of revenue bond-issuing Authorities. In 1957, thirty-two of such
agencies reported outstanding bonds of close to $i billion, primarily for roads,
bridges, and schools.43
Nationally, Department of Commerce data showed $16.9 billion of State debts
outstanding at the end of fiscal 1959. Almost half of this figure represented non-
State-guaranteed debt of $8.2 billion,4 4 most of which is believed attributable to
Authority-type financing.
More recently, significant Authority developments have tended to break away
from the so-called basic type concerned with construction and operation of specific
facilities financed solely by the issuance of revenue bonds to be amortized from
earnings of the projects. Prominent among the newer types are Area Development
Authorities devoted primarily to the expansion of industry and commerce in
metropolitan areas 5 They also may be known as Industrial Credit Authorities, and
usually are empowered to make mortgage loans to non-profit corporations in critical
economic areas. The principal purpose of these federally-supported State lending
agencies is the promotion of industrial development, and their funds are used for
industrial construction in manufacturing industries. Much of the stimulus for their
current popularity results from direct financial support through the resources of the
Small Business Administration. 0 The variety of the statutes and of the organiza-
tions created thereunder have been described as a demonstration of the effectiveness
of our federal system, under which the several States can experiment and devise
special forms to serve particular needs and conditions, benefiting from the experi-
ence of others. 7 Other offshoots which can trace kinship to the Authority are
"'Pennsylvania's Billion Dollar Babies, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia reprint from Bus. Rev.,
March 1958, pp. 1, 4. A modest footnote to one of the charts therein indicates that 70 more muncipal
Authorities were authorized in 19571
"'Spending for Public Improvements, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Monthly Review of Business
Conditions in the Sixth Federal Reserve District, October i958, pp. 1, 3. The area includes Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
"U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SUMMARY OF STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN
1959, at 4 (1960).
"'See, e.g., Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form oj Government by Proclamation,
8 VAND. L. RE,. 678 (1955).
" Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 697, 15 U.S.C. § 687. "Development companies"
are defined therein as "enterprises incorporated under State law with the authority to promote and assist
the growth and development of small-business concerns in the areas covered by their operations," 72
Stat. 690, x5 U.S.C. § 662 (1958).
' STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 86TH CONG., isr SEss., DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS AN AUTHORITIES, REPORTS, STATUTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATIONS AND AUTHORITIES vii (Comm. Print 1959). For recent judicial approval and cita-
tion of cases indicating similar approval in other States, see Industrial Dcv. Authority v. Eastern Kentucky
Regional Planning Comm'If, 332 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 196o).
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commodity corporations and similar units intended to stimulate credit in specific
trading areas.
Although as indicated, the latter combinations are not entirely of the financially
autonomous variety-generally the traditional trademark of a standard Public
Authority-they are nevertheless to be reckoned with as a direct result of the
Authority pattern of growth. Just as the "normal" statistics disseminated by the
Weather Bureau are determined in part by current happenings, yesterday's standard
Authority may be something different tomorrow-because of today's developments.
Primary stress has here been placed upon State-created Authorities in order to
project what has seemed to be a fair overview of the variables manifested by these
instrumentalities. The Authority, of course, flowers equally well and perhaps more
profusely in some areas under the aegis of the municipality or the county or related
geographic region. Authorities under the latter auspices have not been considered
in much detail because their practices involve largely the same general considerations
as their State prototypes.
III
THE ANATOMICAL STRUacrui
As the Public Authority finds its heritage in the origin and development of the
corporation, it will be treated as a special corporation and its formation, powers,
and organizational form considered in such light. Here again it should be noted
that although many Authorities will be affected by the items herein considered, an
"average" Authority probably is a fictional hypothesis, as each Authority is by nature
tailor-made to accomplish specific purposes.
Certain questions have been suggested as a handy guide for consideration in
determining whether the Public Authority (as distinguished from a department of
State Government) is a suitable instrumentality for operating the enterprise:
Is the project self-supporting?
Does it require business efficiency?
Will primary decisions be of a business character?
Are such decisions beyond partisan political considerations?
Are initiative, imagination, and risk-taking required?
Is it important that there be continuity of policy?
Does the program involve an area beyond established political boundaries?
An Authority may be feasible even if all the questions cannot be answered affirma-
tively, but if most of the answers are negative the establishment of what in effect will
be a new division of government probably would-be highly questionable s
Assuming that the necessary prerequisites for a given project have been con-
sidered and determined affirmatively, the Public Authority, for .the purposes of this
discussion, ordinarily evolves in the womb of the legislative process. It is intended
to be a fiscal instrumentality of the State, generally autonomous in its administration,
"Tobin, supra note to, at 12, 13.
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charged with creating and maintaining a specific facility, such as a port, bridge,
highway, transit system, or any of the myriad services demanded by a modern
metropolitan complex.
Usually, the Public Authority is spawned by a special legislative enactment, but it
may be the product of executive action under a general incorporation statute. 49 A
basic legislative scheme embodying special acts for the creation of individual Public
Authorities but also containing general provisions applicable to all Authorities affords
a logical approach to the dual problem of creating an organization to accomplish a
specific goal and permitting standard treatment in the interpretation of limitations or
powers common to all Authorities. Legislative power to create a corporate Authority
has generally been held to be sufficiently broad to permit the utilization of the
Authority device for practically any governmental function capable of being dele-
gated.50
Regardless of its title,5' the so-called standard Authority normally is recognizable
as a corporation with at least the usual attributes possessed by large private business
corporations. These generally will include the standard powers to execute contracts,
to sue and to be sued, to purchase and hold land, to have a seal, to employ personnel,
to make by-laws, to manage its own affairs, and to do all things necessary to
accomplish stated powers. Powers indicating independent authority have been
regarded as a prime requisite on the theory that if direct control should be main-
tained by the general government, the result would be a pure government instru-
mentality not manifesting the managerial independence necessary for the usual
Authority-type operation. The less independent the Authority, the greater the
impossibility of fulfilling its traditional objective of overcoming the barrier of consti-
tutional limitations on public spending.
In the case of the Port of New York Authority, the governors of New York and
New Jersey have equal veto rights, but this statutory power rarely has been in-
voked.52 The reverse side of the coin also should be noted: when an adverse court
decision indicated that the Port of New York Authority was not authorized to
accomplish an important addition to one of its facilities, both the New Jersey and
New York legislatures quickly supplied the missing grant by legislative action 3
Clothed with standard corporate powers, the Public Authority normally derives
financial support from the sale of revenue bonds. Therefore the corporate grant
COUNCL REPORT 38.
• "A State has the right to exercise all its governmental functions and, in the interest of public
welfare, various proprietary functions, but unless there is a constitutional requirement to be mct, it is
free to delegate either governmental or proprietary functions to either public or quasi public corpora-
tions." Hope Natural Gas Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comm'n, Zos S.E.2d 630, 637-38 (W. Va.
1958). And see 8I C.J.S. States S IOI (953).
"
1 Be it remembered that the Authority operation may be masked by the label of "commission,"
"board," "project," and occasionally by "district," although the latter term rarely is applied in current
legislation creating an Authority mechanism.
:
2 COUNCIL REPORT 61, 62.
'Note, The Applicability of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HAuv. L.
REV. 714, 720 n.33 (,961).
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specifically must empower the Authority to issue revenue anticipation bonds for the
particular or general purpose of the project or projects for which the Authority was
created. Ordinarily, statutory provisions expressly prohibit any pledging of the
State's credit, although there are some exceptions to this rule.54
Incidental powers usually will include competence to fix and charge rates, rents,
or tolls, and to accept grants. Important powers to exercise eminent domain, issue
subpoenas, and to provide police protection and regulation, also may be included,
but such powers are generally granted only if their exercise is required to enable the
Authority to accomplish its goals.
Authorities usually are governed by a board of directors but may be organized
with a single executive. As with private corporations, this is a key aspect which
generally dominates the efficient Authority operation. Without superior, properly
motivated board or executive personnel, the managerial independence of the Author-
ity can assume the burden of an albatross. Most directors are not paid salaries but
are usually given a per diem rate to cover expenses. If the chairman of the board
performs substantial managerial functions he usually is paid a salary. Generally,
however, especially in large Authority operations, members of the governing body
perform policy functions, leaving the daily routines to salaried administrators.
The usual alternative to the selection of top caliber businessmen is resort to
ex-officio appointment of public officers. Extensive use of State officials lessens the
Authority's independence of action and enhances the State's desire to oversee the
Authority. Surveys indicate that the governor, an important finance official (e.g.,
the treasurer, comptroller or auditor), and the attorney general are most apt to be
named as ex-officio appointees 5 Some States provide for appointment of legislators,. 6
but this procedure has been condemned as unconstitutional in at least one instance as
in violation of a constitutionally required division of powers0 t
Except where provided otherwise by statute, appointment usually is by the
governor, occasionally subject to legislative consent or nomination by private groups;
and sometimes by election s Removals, ordinarily only for cause, are usually at the
discretion of the governor.59 Overlapping terms of members appear to be favoredP°
Board officers usually serve in part-time capacity, with full-time managerial super-
visors.
Authorities usually are exempt from routine budgetary review and centralized
"New York and New Jersey, COUNCIL REPORT 29; Maine Industrial Building Authority Act, 1957,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 3 8-B, § 3 (i959 Cum. Supp.), approved in advance in Opinion of the Justices,
153 Me. 202, 136 A.2d 528 (1957).
"Inclusion of the attorney general and-though this is rare--supreme court justices as members
would seem to impinge upon the performance of official legal duties pertaining to Authority operation or
litigation.
" COUNCIL REPORT table at 44.
" Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, i49 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958).
"COUNCIL REPORT 42.
,Id. at 45-
'0 Id. at 47.
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personnel procedures," though the extent of control varies. Authority records may
be subjected to an independent audit, with direct legislative control over disposition
of revenues, in addition to the positive check of specific statutory debt limitations.
Provision also may be made for submission of reports to the governor or legislature.0 2
The fiscal apparatus of the Authority has been likened to the heart of the
creature," and this is indeed true, as will be seen from an examination of the detail
of Authority financing.64 Upon retirement of the bonds issued to finance the under-
taking, the Authority normally conveys the property to the State. The fiscal opera-
tions of an Authority may be successful enough to enable it not only to become self-
sufficient as to its immediate objective-such as the liquidation of the cost of a port
project-but also to finance other related projects out of subsequent surpluses from
the initial operation, as has been true in the case of the Port of New York Authority."5
In the formulation of techniques and procedures for Authority operations, the
States have produced varying solutions to the basic problem of combining man-
agerial independence and public accountability. 0  Thus, Authorities generally
enjoy sufficient financial autonomy and freedom from administrative controls to
permit operation in an atmosphere comparable to that of private enterprise. Still,
the States have imposed certain .constitutional, statutory, and administrative limits
upon the freedom of Authorities, in addition to specific supervisory controls, espe-
cially by gubernatorial appointment. Variations and degrees of autonomy and control
can be determined only upon careful scrutiny of the particular Authority under




The problem of accurately identifying and classifying Authorities was en-
countered by the federal government in its effort to conduct a census of governmental
units. 7 In its 1957 census of governments, the Bureau of the Census outlined certain
essential characteristics which a prospective unit must meet for inclusion as a gov-
ernmental unit: (i) existence as an organized entity; (2) governmental character;
-and (3) substantial autonomy s
" Most Authorities which are not under State personnel systems have not established their own merit
-systems, and in only a few instances are employees covered by special acts. COUNCIL REPORT 6o.
"2 See note 48 supra.
"Netherton, supra note 45, at 686.
"See Jones, The Financing of TVA, infra, at 725-40.
' Netherton, supra note 45, at 681.
' COUNCIL REPORT 64.
67 71 Stat. 483 (1957), 13 U.S.C. S x61 (x958) provides: "The Secretary [of Commerce] shall take,
compile and publish for the year 1957 and for every fifth year thereafter a census of governments. Each
such census shall include, but shall not be limited to, data on taxes and tax valuations, governmental
receipts, expenditures, indebtedness, and employees of States, counties, cities, and other governmental
units."
"I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, D.P'T or CommERcE, 1957 CENSUS oF GEVERNMENTS, No. i, Gov-
ERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1957 CENSus].
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Many major Authorities in fact, but in varying degrees, substantially embody each
of the stated essentials. However, the Bureau found that as a class, Authorities
resemble special districts created to serve a single function or a limited number of
functions; but that in many instances the functions were assigned in lieu of, or to
supplement, services ordinarily provided by an established government, and that
most Authorities were not sufficiently -autonomous to be classed as governmental
units."9
For example, in counting State and local governmental units, the Bureau con-
sidered listing statutory Authorities and other similar organizations having certain
characteristics of "independent governments," but determined that administrative or
financial control by the State or other local governments (i.e., counties, municipalities,
townships and towns, school districts, and special districts) required classification of
such units as "subordinate agencies" of such other governments rather than as
independent units."0 The Bureau's conclusions also may have been prompted by
assigning considerable weight to such factors as ex-officio appointments to the
Authority governing body and certain other intangibles. 1
Apparently, the Bureau was not completely satisfied with its selection standards,
for in view of the "infinite variety of provisions regarding local government entities
and particularly the shadings of autonomy which they exhibit," consideration also
was given to "(i) local attitudes as to whether the type of unit involved is in-
dependent or not, and (2) the effect of the decision upon collection and presentation
of statistics of government finances and employment. 7
However, many Authorities generally at the sub-regional, county, or municipal
level were included among the 14,405 special districts listed in the Census. As a
result, some Authorities are included in the census statistics, but many are not,"3 so
that no accurate count of the elusive Authorities appears to be available. 4 Authorities
as a whole seem to be regarded as officially existing in a sort of anonymous de-
pendency status, attached, more or less, to the io2,328 governmental units which
were enumerated by the Bureau. 5
The importance of Public Authorities as a distinctive technique in modern gov-
ernmental administration suggests that the Bureau of the Census might well consider
" Id. at 7. Many special districts possess limited taxing powers and may be directly responsible to the
electorate--characteristics not normally attributable to Public Authorities.
501d. at 12.
1957 CENSUS, No. 3, LocAL. GovERmENT SmRucruuE 3-4.
7 1 Id. at 3.
71 In most cases, it appears that the State Authorities were included as part of the. States, but- many
other Authorities qualified as special districts.
"A financial news editor recently offered an estimate of 3,000. Public ,uthorties, Wall Street Journal,
Dec. i, ig6o, p. x, col. i.
"' The breakdown: U.S. Government, i; States, 48; Counties, 3,047;* Municipalities, 17,183; Townships
&Towns, 17,198; School Districts, 50,446; and Special Districts, 14,405. Also listed but noi included
in'the total "ivere 'fhe then territorial governments of Alaska and Hawaii and their loial government units,
as well as those of Puerto" Rico. 'H 1957 CENSUS, No. i, SummAa.Y or Puasc . a'i6dymNT 4 (1958).
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the possibility of classifying them separately, perhaps as quasi-governmental units,
so that distinct statistics may be accumulated r6
The variables apparent in the Bureau's treatment of Public Authorities make it
hazardous to draw conclusions therefrom. Nevertheless, taking a cue from the
Bureau, by application of arbitrary factors a listing of selected State Authorities is
offered in the following Table.



















University System Building Authority
Idaho Turnpike Controlt
Illinois Toll Highway Commission
Indiana Office Building Commissidn
Toll Road Commission
Iowa Toll Road Authorityf
Kansas Turnpike Authority
Office Building Commissiont









Michigan Mackinac Bridge Authority
New Jersey Highway Authority
Turnpike Authority




North Carolina Ports Authorityt
Ohio Turnpike Commissiont
Oklahoma Grand River Dam Authority
Turnpike Authority
Pennsylvania General State Authority
Turnpike Commission
Highway and Bridge Authority
Public School Building Authority
Rhode Island Mount Hope Bridge Authority
South Carolina Agricultural Marketing Commission
Ports Authorityt
Public Service Authority





Washington Toll Bridge Authority
West Virginia Office Building Commission
Turnpike Commission
* Compied substantially from data contained in I U. S. BURAU oF THE CENsus, DEP'T OF COMMEnCE, 1957 CasNsus oFaov-
rase rs, No. 3, Loc!' GoV.m E sRr. sTRucrURE (1958), and JoBsN MooDY, MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMEuNTAL
MAszUA (1g1). The State Authorities listed generally were treated in the Census as "subordinate agencies and arcas"
of other governmental units and therefore were not reflecten the Bureau's statistical sumnaries. Hi-State and international bodiro(except for the Buffalo & Fort Erie Public Bridg Authority) were statistically included for Census purposes as Special Districts.
t Not included among bond-issuing agencies listedin MooD '.
Since the Census, South Carolina Ports Authority bonds have been authorized as general full faith and credit obligations of the Stato
MooDY's, 187.
" In the past the Bureau primarily was concerned in classifying and enumerating entities which
qualified as independent governmental units-which purpose did not necessitate defining and identifying
Authorities as a separate class of government for census purposes.
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B. Interstate
Arkansas-Mississippi Bridge Commission
Bi-State Development District (Illinois & Missouri)
Breaks Interstate Park Commission (Kentucky & Virginia)
Clinton Bridge Commission (Iowa & Illinois)
Delaware River Basin Water Commission (Delaware, New Jersey, New York & Pennsylvania)
Delaware Port Authority (New Jersey & Pennsylvania)
Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission (New Jersey & Pennsylvania)
Lake Champlain Bridge Commission (New York & New Jersey)
Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority
Port of New York Authority (New York & New Jersey)
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission.
C. International
Niagara Falls Bridge Commission (Canada & New York)
Buffalo & Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority (Canada & New York).
Based primarily on the Bureau's information,7" the selection was generally limited
to State-created Public Authorities which are authorized to issue revenue bonds and
to fix and collect tolls, rentals, or other charges, and (notwithstanding the Bureau's
specificationS78 ) appear to be, if not completely autonomous, at least more in-
dependent of than dependent upon State control. Receipt of incidental federal or
State aid by the Authority was not considered to be a disqualifying factor if issuance
of bonds was authorized. It is emphasized that this is by no means a complete
listing, but it was felt that the information might be of interest to illustrate some of
the important State Authorities and the variety of undertakings reflected thereby. 9
V
SOME LEGAL AsPEcTs
As with any corporate enterprise, the scope of possible litigation affecting
Authorities is extensive. But a great deal of Authority litigation arises by reason
of the fundamental problem encountered in Authority dealings generally: What is
the nature of the Authority? We have observed the almost chameleon-like aspect
of the Authority creature which occasionally seems to change its characteristics when
it is sought to be engaged in focus with respect to its immediate environment.
Many legal complications arising from particular Authority transactions are resolved
upon answering the fundamental question. Space limitations permit no more than
passing consideration.
Legal actions frequently have been of a "friendly" nature brought about by a
mutual desire of interested parties to test the legal basis of a new Authority and the
validity of its revenue bond procedures. Judicial approbation and validation of its
bonds, as well as recognition of the Authority's legal powers generally, are some-
times welcome prerequisites for the accomplishment of any constructive efforts by a
Public Authority. Investors uncertain of subsequent judicial acquiescence in
Authority operations do not provide a likely market for its bonds.
7 Correlated with pertinent listings of bond issue data; JOHN MooDY, MUNICIPAL AND GOVERNMENTAL
MANUAL (g6i).
"81 1957 CENSUS, No. I, GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7.
7 No effort was made to tabulate other than State-level bodies; e.g., the impracticality of listing
Pennsylvania's more than 2oo municipal Authorities needs no further explanation.
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Other, less friendly suits have been brought to declare legislative grants un-
constitutional, and thus to thwart the use of the Authority device."
A. The Authority as a Valid Separate Entity
The power of the legislature to establish a Public Authority to undertake any one
of countless governmental responsibilities is practically unquestioned. In the absence
of a constitutional limitation, there appears to be little or no restraint upon legisla-
tive power to establish any form of corporate Authority endowed with necessary
faculties and attributes to accomplish a legitimate public purpose. A truly govern-
mental function remains so whether performed directly by the sovereign or by a
separate entity for the sovereign."s
A State constitutional provision that the State shall not be made a defendant in
any court does not limit the power of the State to delegate governmental functions
to quasi-public corporations which have no power to tax and are not dependent upon
the State for financial support, even though such corporations are afforded no im-
munity from suit or liability s But the "governmental functions" may be subject
to careful scrutiny to assure that Authority operations will not compete with private
enterprise. 3
In addition, the creation of an autonomous Authority, even with corporate form
and status, for a public purpose does not come within a constitutional inhibition to
the effect that "no [private] corporation shall be created by special law."'84
The Public Authority frequently is challenged upon grounds alleging infringement
of constitutional limitations upon the public debt by use of its borrowing powers.
With some few exceptions-usually to be distinguished by consideration of unique
factors-the courts generally have upheld the Authority powers as not violating public
debt limitations. A number of courts have repelled frontal attacks upon the consti-
tutionality of the revenue-bond and user-charge mechanism by defining the Authority
in terms of an entity separate and distinct from the State, whose debts can in no
way bind the State. 8 Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia has stated:S8
8 0 COUNCIL REPORT 95.
81 "There is no prohibition . . .against the creation by the legislature of every conceivable description
of corporate authority, and when created to endow them with all the faculties and attributes of other
pre-existing corporate authorities." People v. Salmon, 51 Ill. 37, 5o (1869). And see, e.g., United States
v. Washintgon Toll Bridge Authority, 19o F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Wash. 196o); Kennebec Water Dist. v.
City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 52 Ad. 774 (9o2); and Brockenbrough v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 134
N.C. 1, 46 S.E. 28 (I9O3).
11 Hope Natural Gas Co. v.. W 'est Va. Turnpike Comm'n, 105 S.E.2d 63o (W. Va. x959), distinguishing
"a somewhat borderline decision" which had held the State Office Building Commission (having authority
to construct buildings to. hiouse. State agencies,' and supported in part by State funds) to be a State
agency immune. from suit: City of Charleston v. Southeastern, Constr. Co., X34 W. Va. 666, 64 S.E.2d 676(950).
8 See remarks in dissWifng oliif" calling attention to one phase of a Port Authority's purpose
as "a step toward placing the State.... in opert competition with private enterprise ... the very lifeblood
of a free democracy." Sigman v. Brunswick Port Authority, 214 Ga. 332, 338, 104 S.E.2d 467, 473
(1958).
8
, See, e.g., Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 540, 64 S.E.2d 32, 39 (1951).
"See, e.g., Andres v. Eirst.Arkansas Dev. Fin. Corp., 324 $.W.2d 97 (Ark. z959); Opinion of the
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While the authority is an instrumentality of the State, it is nevertheless not the State,
nor a part of the State., nor an agency of the State . . . [and] its revenue bonds . . . are
first, last and always a corporate debt of the Authority and in no sense a debt of the
State.
This line of reasoning can be traced to an early United States Supreme Court
determination, in an important jurisdictional problem, to the effect that a State-
incorporated bank, even though the State be one of the incorporators and hold an
interest therein, was not to be considered as the State; and that the State, as a member
of the corporation, did not exercise its sovereignty with respect to the bank's
activities:8 7
... when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so
far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that
of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its pre-
rogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted....
The state . . . by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips
itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives
all the privileges of that character ....
B. The Special Funds Doctrine
Those who contend that the issuance of bonds by an Authority necessarily binds
the State as the ultimate guarantor frequently are checked by the application of the
"special funds" doctrine 8  This doctrine-largely a development of the law of
municipal corporations-means, in effect, that loans which are to be liquidated by
the use of particular funds derived from the revenues of the activity involved do not
constitute debts within the meaning of any constitutional restriction regarding the
incurrence of a State debt.8 ' Under this view, the Authority's obligations rest upon
its own resources, as the bonds are payable solely from a specified revenue source,
and pledge of the State credit is expressly disclaimed. However, an Authority
Justices, 270 Ala. 147, is6 So.2d 588 (1959), distingiushed from Opinion of the Justices, 264 Ala. 176, 85
So.2d 391 (1956) (plan to procure funds for payment of current operating expenses by issuance of bonds
payable out of proceeds of State taxes).
" McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Authority, 210 Ga. x, 6, 77 S.E.2d 531, 535 (1953)- (Emphasis
added.) The court cited an earlier ruling concerning the University Regents, in which the court
described the University "corporation" as "a mere creature of the state" and added that the "debt of
the creature does not stand upon a level with the creator and never can rise thereto. It is first, last and
always a debt of the creature and in no sense a debt of the creator." State v. Regents of Univ. Sys. of
Georgia, 179 Ga. 2io, 175 S.E. 567 (1934). See, to the same effect, Sigman v. Brunswick Port Authority,
214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958); Indiana State Toll-Bridge Comm'n v. Minor, 236 Ind. X93, 139
N.E.2d 445 (i957); and Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 721, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956).
8 7 Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907-08 (1824).
" Early application of the theory is traced to the decision in Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41
Pac. 885 (1895). See Shestack, The Public Authbrity, 1o5 U. PA. L. Rt. 553, 557-58 (1957).
" See Gerwig, Public Authorities: Legislative Panacea?, 5 J. PtiB. L. 388, 393 (1956); Comment,
Obligations of a State-Created Authority: Do They Constitute a Debt of the State?, 53 Micu. L. Ray. 439,
440 (x955), for a resume of cases; see also Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical
Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14, 21 (1937). For an extensive list of prior cases applying the 'doctrine, see
Foley, Municipal Financing of Public Works, 4 Foanma.i L. RET. 13 n.73 (1i35).
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issuing bonds under a disclaimer that State credit is pledged may find its particular
scheme judicially construed to result in a pledging of the sovereign credit and thus
risk invalidity of its modus operandi. 0
The special funds doctrine now is generally accepted and was applied recently to
uphold bond issues by office building and ports Authorities,' re-emphasizing the
theory that special funds should be derived only from a source related to the project
for the promotion of which the obligation is pledged. 2
A distinction has been drawn between a provision requiring the State to subsidize
an Authority, and a right to contract with the Authority for its services. It was held
that the State may become indebted to the Authority for goods and services but
cannot become indebted to the bondholders of the Authority or the general public
for defaults of the Authorityf3
C. Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability
A basic legal problem affecting Public Authorities concerns the application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The merits of the doctrine generally will not be
discussed here except to note that increasing disfavor may well augur waning
application of the theory to Authorities.94
Generally, in the case of wholly-owned government corporations authorized to
sue and be sued, it appears that this power is sufficient to establish a waiver of
immunity from suitf5 However, some States have been reluctant to depart from
old established precedents and, in absence of persuasive statutory direction, are
unwilling to §ubject Authorities to greater liability than is acknowledged for the
sponsoring State.
In cases where the immunity doctrine was applied, the courts stressed the close
interest and relationship of the State to the particular activity, along with the absence
of a specific waiver of immunity0 This is especially true in personal injury cases.07
9GAyer v. Commissioner of Administration, 165 N.E.2d 885 (Mass. ig6o). This is especially true
if the plan embodies the use of general funds to make up a deficiency, as in Turnpike Authority of
Kentucky v. Wall, 336 S.W.2d 551 (Ky. ig6o).
"Book v. State Office Bldg. Comm'n, 149 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1958); North Carolina State Ports
Authority v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 242 N.C. 416, 88 S.Eo2d 1o9 (1955). Cf., for certain
earlier distinctions, State Ports Authority v. Arnall, 2oi Ga. 713, 41 S.E.2d 246 (1947), and Williamsburg
Say. Bank v. State of New York, 243 N.Y. 231, x53 N.E. 58 (1926); and see criticism of Morris,
Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion o1 State Constitutions,
68 YALE L.. 234-268 (1958).
'2 See Arthur v. Johnston, 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151 (x937).
I'McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Authority, 21o Ga. x, 77 S.E.2d 531 (x953). For additional rami-
fications of the special fund doctrine, including the related limited special fund doctrine (usually in-
volving, as to municipal corporations, the financing of additions to existing systems rather than an
original system), see CHRL.s S. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § X4-7, at 335 (1957).
"For some recent trends, see Annots., 6o A.L.R.2d 1198 (1958), and 62 A.L.R.2d 2x1i (x958). See
also Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (196!); Lipman v. Brisbane
Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 359 P.2d 465 (196!).
"'See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (939), and Annot., 83 L. Ed.
794, 807 (1939).
"See, e.g., Fowler v. California Toll-Bridge Authority, 128 F.2d 549 (gth Cir. 1942); Kansas City
Bridge Co. v. Alabama State Bridge Corp., 59 F.2d 48 (Sth Cir. 1932); Masse v. Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n, x63 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Pa. 5958); Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Indiana, 123 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.
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Courts in such cases also have construed specified powers of the sue-and-be-sued.
variety in context with powers to contract and words of similar import as relating.
to procedural rights only and have not deemed the suability provision as constituting:.
a waiver of immunity or consent to suit for tort liabilityf s And in other situations,.
especially in the case of highway or turnpike and hospital Authorities, the apparent.
waiver has been construed strictly so as to relate only to such actions as are necessary
to carry out the purpose of the activityP
A significant decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge case is of particular interest here. Here, an interstate Authority was.
established pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal Constitution. In consider-
ing the compact as a "means of safeguarding the national interest" rather than merely-
a "supple device for dealing with interests confined within a region," the Court
disregarded the local law of the respective States and found, as a consequence of-
congressional approval of a sue-and-be-sued clause in the compact, that the bi-State-
instrumentality was amenable to suit for tort liability 00
A federal court of appeals found that a Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission,
authorized by statute to sue and be sued in its own name, was neither the alter ego
of the Commonwealth nor endowed with the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity
from suit in a tort action based on negligence °1
Other courts also have construed the sue-and-be-sued power as an effective waiver-
of immunity.' 2 Such decisions may be ascribed to an increasing understanding of
the need to protect the public from functions (though carried on ostensity for govern-
mental purposes) which are indistinguishable from private business activities. The-
liberal attitude doubtless was influenced by the fact that many of the early decisions
applying the immunity doctrine in the general area of government liability were-
made within a context of relatively limited governmental activity, and then gen-
erally in cases affecting the exercise of traditional governmental or police powers.
Another recent view-with an eye toward the point of ultimate pecuniary-
impact-suggests that the application of the sovereign immunity doctrine cannot be-
justified in the case of independent Authorities because the financial burden of
liability would not, as in the case of the State, fall on general treasury funds but-
Ind. 1954); Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 1o6 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1958); Hosterman v..
Kansas Turnpike Authority, x83 Kans. 590, 331 P.2d 323 (1958); Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina.
Pub. Serv. Authority, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
o See Connor v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 91 F. Supp. Z62 (E.D.S.C. 1950).
0 See Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist. v. Beecher, 117 S.E.2d 685 (Va. g6I).
*0 Annots., 62 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1958), 25 A.L.R.2d 203, 224 (1952).
100 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (x959), reversing 254 F.2d 857 (8th-
Cir. 1958). Of interest here is a 196o Governors' Conference resolution opposing "federal interference"
with already established interstate compact agencies. Resolutions, 33 STATE GoVNMENr 182 (196o)..
'
0
°Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Gerr, 282 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 196o), cert. denied, 365 U.S-
817 (196x).
..
2 Hoffmeyer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, x66 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio C.P. x96o); Linger v. Pennsylvania-
Turnpike Comm'n, 158 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22.
N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956). Tort liability has been recognized, especially in Housing Authority cases.
See, e.g., Knowles v. Housing Authority of Columbus, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1956); Muses v-
Housing Authority, 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, x89 P.2d' 3 o5 (1958); Annot., 61 A.L.R.:id 1246 , 1247 (1958).-
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would be chargeable against the tolls, rents, or other charges which accrue to the
Authority in its own right. Critics of this theory reiterate the oft-suggested possi-
bility that the State, though not legally liable, might feel obliged to use State funds
to liquidate the Authority's debt.0 3 Nevertheless, in arguing for a literal inter-
pretation of sue-and-be-sued clauses, the conclusion was expressed that historical
policies behind sovereign immunity would not seem to be infringed to any significant
extent by a refusal to apply the doctrine to independent Authorities.'0 4
The trend in New York, for instance, has been drifting away from the sovereign
immunity doctrine. Although the Port of New York Authority originally was held
immune to suit,105 subsequent legislation waived immunity, including liability for
tortious acts; and more recently, the New York legislative commission, in order "to
remove doubt" as to those Authorities which were not made amenable to suit by
specific provision, recommended that all New York Authorities expressly be made
liable for actions in tort.' 8
D. Legislative Control
The precise degree of control that legally may be exercised over the Authority by
the legislature involves an intriguing array of economic, social, philosophic, as well
as legal considerations. The true nature and significance of this issue was em-
phasized when the Port of New York Authority officials declined to furnished certain
internal records to a congressional subcommittee which undertook an inquiry into
the operations of the bi-State Authority to determine the necessity for legislation
affecting the original compact under which Congress approved the Authority. De-
spite apparently conciliatory efforts by Governors Rockefeller and Meyner, of New
York and New Jersey (at whose insistence the Authority files were withheld), the
important jurisdictional questions could not be resolved short of contempt pro-
ceedings against one of the nation's best known Authority administrators, Austin
J. Tobin, executive director. As the controversy brings into sharp focus the scope
of the congressional investigative function, it is unlikely that the matter will termi-
nate with the adverse judgment of the federal trial court against the Port Authority
official,107 but full appellate consideration well may ensue.
When a Massachusetts legislative commission in i95o asked an Authority for
information to aid in its survey of State government operations, the executive director
replied: "The Authority, while recognizing the desirable and laudable purposes for
which your committee is functioning, feels there is a possible error in your request
... it is the opinion of the Authority that our activities do not come within the scope
... Such assistance occasionally has been given. COUNCIL REPORT 78.
101 Note, The Applicability of Sovereign Immunity to Independent Public Authorities, 74 HARv. L.
REV. 714 (196i).
' 
1 0 5Howell"v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F: Supp: 797 (D.N.J. 1940).
"o" N.Y. STUDY 99.
°'Unitid States v.'Tobin,'r95 F. Supp. '88 (D.D.C. 1961), decided by Judge Youngdahl, appealed
to' the *Circuit Court. The'isational significance of the case 'was emphasized by the participation of
tw'enty other stitds in a brief filed by'the'Attorney deneral for the State of Florida. See Celler, Cohgres, i
Compacts, and Interstate, Athorties, infra, at 682-7o2.
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of your committee." In a similar vein, a Massachusetts Authority chairman stated
that his Authority was not a public corporation. Still another veteran Authority
administrator described the work of certain New York Authorities with which he is
associated as "business with private capital under public auspices," and criticized a
bill to force New York Authorities to report more fully to the legislature as "ob-
viously a first step towards subjecting authorities to political controls and the
enervating effect of centralized bureaucratic management." The legislators, on the
other hand, decried the Authorities' lack of sympathy for "democracy."' 8
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the Tobin case, practicalities suggest
that the degree of control should be flexible, depending substantially on the apparent
requirements of a given situation. The measure of control should correspond to the
degree to which the Authority accomplishes its purpose. As the mission of the
Authority generally is one which a legislative body has deemed inappropriate for
customary governmental operation, minimum controls normally should be exer-
cised. However, if improper management imperils the successful completion of the
objective, the duty of the sovereign power is dear, even to the ultimate point of
abolition, if satisfactory solution cannot be accomplished by the lawmakers and the
Public Authority.
E. Taxation
Although a Public Authority normally is not considered a political subdivision of
a State, nevertheless provisions of the Internal Revenue Code authorizing exemption
from federal income taxes of interest on bonds issued by a political subdivision were
judicially applied to the Port of New York Authority.0 9 The rationale here seems
to be that at least with respect to tax laws, the term "political subdivision" includes
instrumentalities as well as traditional political entities such as the special districts
and other territorial units.
Despite the federal government's contention that an Authority which took over
an extensive ferry system previously operated as a private business thereby entered
into a proprietary activity not entitled to immunity from taxation, a federal district
court has also held recently that the maintenance of a highway system, including
necessary bridges as well as ferry services as essential links in the system, was a clear
exercise of a traditional and essential governmental function and therefore not subject
to federal transportation taxes.10°
As a government instrumentality, the Authority is not likely to be subjected to
State property taxation."' It is not unusual, however, for an Authority to make
10' Cameron, Whose Authority?, ATLArc MosrLy, Aug. 1959, PP. 38, 39-40.
10 Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792
(1944); Commissioner v. \White's Estate, 144 F.ad 1o9 (2d Cir. 1944); accord, as to this point,
Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority, 178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1959); Note Judge Frank's
extended dissent in Shamberg (although he conceded he "would not go to the stake" to vindicate his
position), 144 F.2d at ioo6.
1' United States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, go F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Wash. x96o).
" Opinion of Justices, 334 Mass. 72E, 136 N.E.2d 223 (1956); and see Smith v. Smith, 121 S.E.ad
113, 18 (Ga. 1961). But closer scrutiny of Authority operations for tax purposes may be expected as,
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_payments in lieu of taxes to prevent undue loss of tax income by the areas involved
.as a result of acquisition of property by Authorities. It has been held recently that
.a lessee of an Authority may be charged such "in-lieu" payments to meet demands
-.of public policy that lessees of a public landlord should not receive a windfall at
.the public expense." 2
F. General
The courts are not likely to overturn routine determinations by Authority admin-
istrators. On specific issues involving judicial review of administrative decisions,
a federal court upheld the determination of a turnpike commission,1 13 while a State
-court even declined to review a similar case."14
Although the exercise of eminent domain by Authorities occasionally prompts
,challenge, courts are not prone, especially in cases involving complex problems of
.administration and valuation, to favor hypertechnical objections when the legislative
.grant is clearY114a
When a State through a parking Authority leases public property, the proscrip-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee 1 4b
An effort by a labor union to remove to the federal courts an Authority's state
-court action to enjoin the union's picketing activities proved fruitless when it was
not clear that the complaint arose under laws of the United States. l 4c
Miscellaneous legal problems affecting the powers of Authorities generally
.are determined in accordance with principles of corporation law, tempered by the
.always present controlling factor of the public interest.
VI
AN APPRAISAL
A. Selected Advantages and Disadvantages
The rapid development of the Public Authority phenomenon during the years
-following the depression of the I93O'S and World War II generally was accepted
.at least as a practical and necessary, if not altogether ideal, governmental device.
'Observers of the early trend usually cited for justification of the Authority method
such primary advantages as operating efficiency because of dependence upon earnings
rather than legislative largess, and the convenient credit base that affected neither
for example, in situations where Authority-type agencies acquire land which is not immediately put
"to use for the Authority's assigned mission. See, e.g., item involving Pennsylvania Turnpike Commis-
.sion, Wall St. Journal, July 5, 196i, p. i, col. 5.
... National Cold Storage Co. v. Port of New York Authority, 26 Misc.2d 570, 207 N.Y.S.2d 171
-(Sup. Ct. i96o).
"'Guaranty Trust Co. v. West Virginia Turnpike Comm'n, 109 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.W.Va. 1952).
11 Owens v. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 283 P.2d 827 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
:893 (i955).
:"E.g., Cervieri v. Port of New York Authority, 34 N.Y. 144, 167 A.2d 6o9, appeal (treated as a
;petition for certiorari) denied, 367 U.S. 487 (196I).
""bBurton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 364 U.S. 81o (i96z), involving refusal by lessee
,restaurant operator to serve a Negro.
"14" South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Local 1422, International Longshoremen's Union, x91 F.
ISupp. 156 (E.D.S.C.), appeal dismissed, 367 U.S. 910 (1961).
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debt limits nor tax burdens." 5  Further, the magnitude of tasks suited to the
Authority technique involved costs which far exceeded ordinary budget possibilities
for a department typical of State administration. Moreover, the concentrated effort
of an Authority ordinarily could not be matched by a regular State unit burdened
with diverse responsibilities."' In addition, problems of overlapping or conflicting
jurisdiction were found to be more easily resolved by the use of Authorities.
But professional commentators were not unaware of certain sensitive areas in
the Authority business. For example, it was suggested that a financial default by an
Authority would undoubtedly have a marked adverse effect upon the credit standing
of the sponsoring governmental unit.ll 7
And as the Authority loomed larger upon the public scene, criticisms and fears
waxed louder and stronger, as for example :"18
... a governmental progress achieved after years of painful civic effort has been nullified
by the tendency to take "normal" functions away from the normal agencies of government
and turn them over to new autonomous agencies that are quasi-public, quasi-private and,
if one may be facetious, just plain quasi-quasi.
Also: 119
... We are trying to evade constitutional or statutory debt limitations; we are refusing to
*ace up to government-wide problems of poor personnel, financial and administrative
practices; we are advocating basic reorganizational efforts . . . and then nullifying them
with a series of weak-brained efforts .... [W]e avoid politics by playing a new and
perhaps dirtier kind of "non-politics." We are promoting a new type of government
that may prove to be not only nonprofit and non-political but nonsensical as well ....
General government is in danger of being superseded by a set of Authority-type ganglia
,directed by a small, weak brain.
More importantly, it seemed, citizens stood in danger of losing their right of
representation in the supervision of governmental operations. Even the course of
industrial development was largely subject to helmsmen beyond the traditional in-
fluences of government and the electorate.
In 1953 the Council of State Governments fairly defined the Authority dilemma :120
- .. it offers an efficient method of administering a variety of projects and ... in some
circumstances its seems to be an indispensable method of financing them. Its use enables
state government to provide facilities of great benefit to many citizens .... But the
Public Authority is not a panacea for all the financial troubles of the States, nor does its
adoption guarantee efficient administration of a project. Creation of an excessive number
of Authorities, even for self-liquidating projects . .. may have undesirable consequences.
It may weaken gubernatorial and legislative control over major state functions and become
a divisive element in over-all public policy. Finally the establishment of too many Public
11 See, .g., Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14
(1937).
". See COUNCIL REPORT 110.
117 Id. at 33.
"" McLean, Use and Abuse of Authorities, 42 NAT. Muir. REV. 438, 441 (i953).
110 Id. at 444.
1"o COUNCIL REPORT 113-X4.
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Authorities in a State ... could cause an undue share of the burden of support for State
activities to be shifted from general taxes to special user charges.
The institution of Public Authorities as a sort of legislative catalyst to general
expanded public services not conveniently possible through normal governmental
operations now has weathered successive cycles of enthusiasm and rebuke. The
popular surge of Public Authorities probably reached its peak during the i95o's.
Although new Authorities still are being established, the rate of increase has di-
minished,'21 and many of the older ones have suspended or terminated operations.
This is not altogether surprising for, in a sense, Authorities may be running out of
new things to do, as one spokesman has suggested. 22 But there is probably a more
basic reason. Public Authorities concededly have advanced beyond the stage of novel
public financing devices and now confront the inevitable fate of any flourishing
political mechanism: they have become a prime target of public scrutiny.
In one case, Authority directors became involved in a conspiracy with a con-
tracting firm to defraud the Authority on certain land contracts, leading to prison
sentences for the principals in a large-scale swindle. Another case of unfavorable
publicity arose when some nonsalaried members of another Authority were indicted
for improper use of expense money. More recently, it was alleged that an agency
which handles most of an Authority's insurance business spent large sums for pur-
poses of inducement. This was denied on the ground that the money involved
represented legitimate business expenses- 23
These, of course, are isolated instances, but they indicate the constant necessity for
self-imposed high business standards by Authority management officials.
The practice of successful Authorities to pay substantial salaries to chief ad-
ministrators occasionally draws critical fire. Although the salaries seem high in
some cases, the New York Legislative Commission in 1956 found them to be more
appropriate to the responsibilities involved than are the generally lower levels of
federal, state, and local executive salaries' 24
As the once protective immunity of Authority operations fades, and the mysteri-
ous, almost magic manner in which Authorities developed into a new governmental
dimension (in truth, perhaps a quasi-form of government-e.g., Netherton's "govern-
ment by proclamation' 25 ) is illumined by the light of searching inquiry, a more
normal and acceptable status may emerge. Certainly Authorities are not sacrosanct
but are subject to modifications suggested by experience.
The Public Authority has been adversely criticized as a socialistic undertaking. 28
It might seem doubtful whether such adverse criticism remains valid today in the face
of the evolution of governmental objectives. A veteran Authority spokesman says
122 Wall Street Journal, Dec. x, 196o, p. i, col. z.
129 Statement by Wade S. Smith, ibid.
123 Ibid.
121 N.Y. STUDY 204, and Wall Street Journal, Dec. z, i96o, p. I, col. x.
'0 Netherton, Area Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclamation, 8 VANO.
L. REv. 678 (1955).
120 See Foley, Revenue Financing of Public Enterprise, 35 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1936).
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that in any case, this charge is misdirected, for the objection relates to the task chosen
by the legislature rather than to the Authority as a technique.1 7  A specific rebuttal
for this type of general criticism can be found in the case history of the Long Island
Transit Authority which was established to rehabilitate a privately-owned bankrupt
railroad. When its purpose was accomplished, including the return of the railroad
to private ownership, the Authority's enabling act was repealed.'
Authorities by their nature tend to assume an unnecessary accumulation of power,
removed as they are from direct administrative, legislative, or electoral control. Some
call this empire-building' 9 Originally conceived to accomplish a specific objective,
many Authorities have remained in business after completing a basic project, in order
to commence new ventures.130 An Authority's policies, in fact, can predetermine
the direction of economic movement within its area of influence. Consequences of
such decisions may not become apparent until long after any effective counteraction
can be mounted. Unrestricted, a Public Authority conceivably could develop into
an extra-legal power of indefinite proportions.
To avoid the eventualities predicted by pessimistic observers, legislative bodies
should ponder anew the basic condition under which many modern Authorities were
born: The necessity for an expedient to overcome restrictions imposed upon other
administrative tools. The possibility of minimizing constitutional debt controls
should be explored because the need for rigid limitation has become something of a
question mark, especially as the courts have tended to recognize known community
desires despite possible constitutional barriers.' 3 ' More flexible and realistic than a
constitutional limitation is the marketplace for securities-an effective barrier against
spendthrift communities' 32  It has been argued that debt limitations do not in fact
limit but simply encumber the fiscal processes and ultimately increase the cost of
public facilities, 133 as, for example, by increased interest on bond borrowings not
backed by the general credit of the State. Constitutional reform in this area may
reduce the need for wholesale Authority operations and bring bona fide governmental
operations within reasonable control. Still, some extremists assert that there is no
middle ground: either the Authority or the debt restriction must go.
134
It is not intended to imply that the Authority, as a whole, has not proved itself
to be a workable device.'" There are too many concrete examples of dramatic
accomplishments which were well-nigh impossible of achievement by other means.
" Tobin, supra note io, at 27.
..
8 N.Y. STUDY 35.
'"'Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1, 196o, p. i, col. x.
1.0 E.g., a Port Authority embarking on urban renewal.
'a
3 Magnusson, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations As a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25
GEo. AVsH. L. REv. 377, 395 (1957)-
132 Ibid.
Z Landers, Constitutional Provisions on Taxation and Finance, 33 STATE GOVERNMENT 39 (196o).
14Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities; The Costly Subversion of
State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958).
... See, e.g., Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclama-
tion, 8 VAND. L. REv. 678, 696 0955).
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It is suggested, however, that the Authority as a prescription for debt limitation
problems is an extraordinary remedy which should not be used in the case of
ordinary governmental needs.
Authority spokesmen decry the need for executive and legislative controls over
Authority operations. Theoretically, their position is sound, for in the ideal environ-
ment of an efficient Authority accomplishing a substantial and useful public service,
with an alert executive and legislature in the background, the exercise of actual
control would be minimal. To achieve and maintain this utopian existence, the
Authority is bound to implement sound management policies in every area of
activity. Its top administrators must adhere to strict ethical standards to refute even
the slightest suspicion of impropriety. Indeed, the Authority by its unique status
can develop the high standards of public service 36 that are desirable in all govern-
ment areas.
B. Conclusions
The history of Public Authorities in the United States, especially at State and
lower political levels, establishes their popular use as a governmental instrumentality
primarily engaged in financing and operating substantial public works not feasible
for normal government undertakings.
Their extremely rapid development in recent years-largely influenced by long-
contained needs for expansion of public facilities-in many instances was accom-
panied by a lack of planned research and orderly legislation which probably would
have reduced complaints, criticism, and misunderstanding over their use.
General acceptance of the Public Authority form in its usual echelons of operation
(municipal, district or county, state and interstate) imposes an implied responsibility
for high-grade standards of performance upon all concerned-from conception of
the idea through the legislative implementation thereof and the construction, opera-
tion, maintenance, and termination of the project.. Appropriate safeguards must in
each phase assure a substantial discharge of the public trust implicit in the powers
granted to Authorities.
Apart from generally favorable judicial recognition, areas of lingering doubt over
the scope and manner of Authority operations may be resolved by comprehensive
legislative task forces qualified to audit the need and application of Public Authori-
ties in the local environment, as well as by impartial groups, including the Council
of State Governments, whose perspective affords a broader approach to such
problems.
Distinctive objectives and influences bearing on a particular Authority make it
imperative to subject individual Authorities to the laboratory of political, economic,
social, and legal research and analysis. Generalities must be subordinated to the
pertinent needs of a given Authority, viewed as a part of an integrated governmental
scheme.' 7 In short, the details of specific Authority operation must be custom-built
18 Tobin, supra note 1o, at 25.
"
T For instance, whether exclusive ex-officio maangement of an Authority or a combination of
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in each case and can perhaps be determined only after actual experience factors are
available for study.
On the other hand, some random observations of a broad nature may be apposite:
A comprehensive general Authority statute with special provision for specific
Authorities provides a sound basis for systematic Authority operation as well as for
guidance in litigation where necessary.
The extent of broad government powers for Authorities, especially those which
involve eminent domain, subpoena, police regulation, etc., should be delineated with
care and attuned to realistic requirements.
Excessive appointment of ex-officio personnel to the governing body sometimes is
difficult to justify. This is especially true in the case of officers whose official
responsibilities may encompass legal or judicial consideration of Authority activities.
A balance of ex-officio and other directors offers a fair compromise between govern-
ment and business representatives.
The Public Authority appears to be especially effective when jurisdictional bar-
riers would tend to bar necessary development or expansion of facilities beyond the
scope of a particular political subdivision. At least at the lower levels of the govern-
mental hierarchy, particular care should be given to the adequacy of controls
(without, however, destroying the essential independence of Authority operation)
to permit proper evaluation by the sponsor. Conversely, if the primary purpose of the
Authority is to overcome constitutional debt limitations, the practical possibility of
modifying such restrictions should be carefully explored with a view toward pursuing
the desired objective within the framework of existing government machinery.
The determination of the proper degree and nature of control to be exercised by
the sponsoring body involves a delicate adjustment to specific needs. Over-control
tends to defeat the purpose and characteristic operation of the Authority device.
At the other extreme, wholly independent operations of the Authority in a completely
autonomous vacuum may undermine its own effectiveness, either by leading to
excessive exercise of power or by breeding suspicion of improper practices. Quite
apart from the issue of control per se, there is a need to establish appropriate pro-
cedures for reporting statistics and data for general census purposes and for technical
and legal research and study.
In 1953, the Council of State Governments found :138
The Public Authority has become a major instrument of government, and it is a growing
one. Its success in the future will depend on sound decisions as to the circumstances
under which it should be used and on the character of its administration in action.
The 1953 conclusion is still valid. Just as a highly developed mechanical device
can increase the efficiency of a skilled craftsman, the Authority provides a means
government officers and private citizens is better cannot be determined for all Authorities within a
political subdivision. Similarly, the alternatives of using salaried or nonsalaried directors and executives
must be explored within the context of a specific problem.5 8 COtrNCIL REPORT 114.
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for efficiency in governmental activities, provided it is employed with discretion
to meet special problems beyond the framework of normal governmental machinery
and is operated by experienced administrators along competent businesslike lines.
Under such circumstances, the Authority can continue to produce creditable con-
tributions to the public service.
